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Abstract
We study an online linear classification problem, in which the data is generated by strategic agents
who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner
deploys a classifier, and an adversarially chosen agent arrives, possibly manipulating her features to
optimally respond to the learner. The learner has no knowledge of the agents’ utility functions or “real”
features, which may vary widely across agents. Instead, the learner is only able to observe their “revealed
preferences” — i.e. the actual manipulated feature vectors they provide. For a broad family of agent
cost functions, we give a computationally efficient learning algorithm that is able to obtain diminishing
“Stackelberg regret” — a form of policy regret that guarantees that the learner is obtaining loss nearly
as small as that of the best classifier in hindsight, even allowing for the fact that agents will best-respond
differently to the optimal classifier.
1 Introduction
Machine learning is typically studied under the assumption that the data distribution a classifier is deployed
on is the same as the data distribution it was trained on. However, the outputs of many classification and
regression problems are used to make decisions about human beings, such as whether an individual will
receive a loan, be hired, be admitted to college, or whether their email will pass through a spam filter. In
these settings, the individuals have a vested interest in the outcome, and so the data generating process is
better modeled as part of a strategic game in which individuals edit their data to increase the likelihood of
a certain outcome. Tax evaders may carefully craft their tax returns to decrease the likelihood of an audit.
Home buyers may strategically sign up for more credit cards in an effort to increase their credit score. Email
spammers may modify their emails in order to evade existing filters. In each of these settings, the individuals
have a natural objective that they want to maximize — they want to increase their probability of being (say)
positively classified. However, they also experience a cost from performing these manipulations (tax evaders
may have to pay some tax to avoid an audit, and email spammers must balance their ability to evade spam
filters with their original goal in crafting email text). These costs can be naturally modeled as the distance
between the “true” features x of the individual and the manipulated features x′ that he ends up sending,
according to some measure. In settings of this sort, learning can be viewed as a game between a learner
and the set of individuals who generate the data, and the goal of the learner is to compute an equilibrium
strategy of the game (according to some notion of equilibrium) that maximizes her utility.
The relevant notion of equilibrium depends on the order of information revelation in the game. Frequently,
the learner will first deploy her classifier, and then the data generating players (agents) will get to craft their
data with knowledge of the learner’s classifier. In a setting like this, the learner should seek to play a
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game — i.e. she should deploy the classifier that minimizes her error after
the agents are given an opportunity to best respond to the learner’s classifier. This is the approach taken
by the most closely related prior work: Bru¨ckner and Scheffer (2011) and Hardt et al. (2016). Both of these
papers consider a one-shot game and study how to compute the Stackelberg equilibria of this game. To do
this, they necessarily assume that the learner has (almost) full knowledge of the agents’ utility functions;
in particular, it is assumed that the learner has access to the “true” distribution of agent features (before
1
manipulation), and that the costs experienced by the agents for manipulating their data are the same for all
agents and known to the learner1.
The primary point of departure in our work is to study the strategic classification problem when the
learner does not know the utility functions of the agents: neither their true features x, nor the cost they
experience for manipulation (which can now differ for each agent). In this setting, it no longer makes sense
to study learning as a one-shot game; we cannot compute an equilibrium when the utility functions of the
agents are unknown. Instead, we model the learning process as an iterative, online procedure. In rounds
t, the learner proposes a classifier βt. Then, an agent arrives, with an unknown set of d “true” features
xt ∈ Rd, and an unknown cost function dt : Rd × Rd → R for manipulation. The learner observes only the
manipulated set of features xˆt ∈ Rd, that represent the agent’s best response to βt. After classification, the
learner observes the agent’s true label yt, and suffers the corresponding loss. Crucially, the learner never
gets to observe either xt or dt, and we do not even assume that these are drawn from a distribution (they
may be adversarially chosen). The only access that the learner has to these parameters is via the revealed
preferences of the agents — the learner gets to observe the actions of the agents, which are the result of
optimizing their unknown utility functions. The learner must use this information to improve her classifier.
We measure the performance of our algorithms via a quantity that we call Stackelberg regret : informally,
by comparing the average loss of the learner to the loss she could have experienced with the best fixed
classifier in hindsight, taking into account that the agents would have best-responded differently had she
used a different classifier. If the learner were in fact interacting with the same agent repeatedly, or if the
agents (xt, dt) were drawn from a fixed distribution, then the guarantee of diminishing Stackelberg regret
would imply the convergence to a Stackelberg equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game. However,
Stackelberg regret is more general, and applies even to settings in which the agents are adversarially chosen.
We add one further twist. Previous work on strategic classification has typically assumed that all agents
are strategic. However, the equilibrium solutions that result from this assumption may be undesirable. For
example, in a spam classification setting, the Stackelberg-optimal classifier may attain its optimal accuracy
only if all agents — even legitimate (non-spam) senders — actively seek to manipulate their emails to avoid
the spam filter. In these settings, it would be more desirable to compute a classifier that was optimal under
the assumption that spammers would attempt to manipulate their emails in order to game the classifier, but
that did not assume legitimate senders would. To capture this nuance, in our model, only agents whose true
label yt = −1 (e.g. spammers) are strategic, and agents for whom yt = 1 are non-strategic.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
The problem that the learner must solve is a bi-level optimization problem in which the objective of the
inner layer (the agents’ maximization problem) is unknown. Even with full information, bi-level optimization
problems are often NP-hard. As a first step in our solution, we seek to identify conditions under which the
learner’s optimization problem is convex. Under these conditions, computing an optimal solution would be
tractable in the full information setting. The remaining difficulty is solving the optimization problem in our
limited feedback model.
We study learners who deploy linear classifiers βt, and consider two natural learner loss functions: logistic
loss (corresponding to logistic regression) and hinge loss (corresponding to support vector machines). The
agents in our model are parameterized by target feature vectors xt and cost functions dt, and will play
the modified feature vector xˆt(βt) that maximizes their utility given βt. We model agent utility functions
as ut(xˆ, β) = 〈β, xˆ〉 − dt(xt, xˆt). Using tools from convex analysis, we give general conditions on the cost
functions dt that suffice to make the learner’s objective convex, for both logistic and hinge loss, for all xt.
These conditions are satisfied by (among other classes of cost functions) any squared Mahalanobis distance
and, more generally, by any norm-induced metric raised to a power greater than one.
1The particulars of the models studied in Bru¨ckner and Scheffer (2011) and Hardt et al. (2016) differ. Bru¨ckner and Scheffer
model a single data generation player who manipulates the data distribution, and experiences cost equal to the squared ℓ2
distance of his manipulation. Hardt et al. study a model in which each agent can independently manipulate his own data point,
but assume that all agents experience cost as a function of the same separable cost function, known to the learner.
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Finally, we turn to the learner’s optimization problem. Once we have derived conditions under which the
learner’s optimization problem is convex, we can in principle achieve quickly diminishing Stackelberg regret
with any algorithm for online bandit (i.e. zeroth order) optimization that works for adversarialy chosen loss
functions. However, we observe that when some of the agents are non-strategic (e.g. the non-spammers),
there is additional structure that we can take advantage of. In particular, on rounds for which the agent is
non-strategic, the learner can also derive gradients for her loss function, in contrast to rounds on which the
agent is strategic, where she only has access to zeroth-order feedback. To take advantage of this, we analyze
a variant of the bandit convex optimization algorithm of Flaxman et al. (2005) which can make use of both
kinds of feedback. The regret bound we obtain interpolates between the bound of Flaxman et al. (2005),
obtained when all agents are strategic, and the regret bound of online gradient descent Zinkevich (2003),
obtained when no agents are strategic, as a function of the proportion of the observed agents which were
strategic.
1.2 Further Related Work
In the adversarial or strategic learning literature, the most closely related works are Bru¨ckner and Scheffer
(2011) and Hardt et al. (2016), as discussed above, which also consider notions of Stackelberg equilibrium,
and make other similar modelling choices. Liu and Chawla (2009) also model adversarial learning as a
Stackelberg game. Other works in this line model the learning problem as a purely adversarial (zero sum)
game as in Dalvi et al. (2004) for which the appropriate solution concept is a minmax equilibrium, study
the simultaneous move equilibria of non-zero sum games as in Bru¨ckner et al. (2012); Bru¨ckner and Scheffer
(2009), and study the Bayes-Nash equilibria of incomplete information games given Bayesian priors on the
player types as in Großhans et al. (2013). Common to all of these works is the assumption that the learner
either has full knowledge of the data generator’s utility functions (when Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are
computed), or else knowledge of a prior distribution (when Bayes-Nash equilibria are computed). The point
of departure of the current paper is to assume that the learner does not have this knowledge, and instead
only has the power to observe agent decisions in response to deployed learners.
There is a parallel literature in machine learning and algorithmic game theory focusing on the prob-
lem of learning from revealed preferences — which corresponds to learning from the choices that agents
make when optimizing their (unknown) utility functions in response to some decision of the learner as in
Beigman and Vohra (2006). This literature has primarily focused on how buyers with unknown combinato-
rial valuation functions make purchases in response to prices. Learning problems studied in this literature
include learning to predict what purchase decisions a buyer will make in response to a set of prices drawn
from an unknown distribution as in Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012); Balcan et al. (2014), finding prices
that will maximize profit or welfare after buyers best respond as in Amin et al. (2015); Roth et al. (2016,
2017), and generalizations of these problems as in Jabbari et al. (2016). We study the problem of strategic
classification with this sort of “revealed preferences” feedback.
Finally, Stackelberg games are studied extensively in the “security games” literature: see Tambe (2011)
for an overview. Most closely related to this paper is the work of Balcan et al. (2015), who develop no-regret
algorithms for certain kinds of security games when “attackers” arrive online, using a notion of regret that
is equivalent to the “Stackelberg regret” that we bound. This work is similar in motivation to ours: its goal
is to give algorithms to compute equilibrium-like strategies for the “defender” without assuming that he has
an unrealistic amount of knowledge about his opponents’ utility functions. Technically, the work is quite
different, since we are operating in very different settings. In particular, Balcan et al. (2015) are primarily
interested in information theoretic bounds, and do not give computationally efficient algorithms (since in
general, solving Stackelberg security games is NP hard — see Korzhyk et al. (2010).)
2 Model and Preliminaries
We study a sequential binary classification problem in which a learner wishes to classify a sequence of
examples over n rounds. The example at each round t is associated with an agent at = (xt, yt, dt), where
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xt ∈ Rd is the feature vector, yt ∈ {−1, 1} is the true label and dt : Rd ×Rd → R is a distance function that
maps pairs of feature vectors to costs. We will think of dt(x, xˆ) as the cost for the agent to change his feature
vector x to the feature vector xˆ. If the example is positive (yt = 1), then we say the agent is non-strategic,
and if the example is negative (yt = −1), then we say the agent is strategic.
Each agent at has a utility function ut(x, β) = 〈β, x〉−dt(xt, x). In each round t, the interaction between
the learner and the agent is the following:
1. The learner commits to a linear classifier parameterized by βt ∈ K, where K is the set of feasible
parameters.
2. An adversary, oblivious to the learner’s choices up to round t, selects an agent at = (xt, yt, dt).
3. The agent at sends the data point xˆt to the learner:
• If the agent is strategic (yt = −1), then the agent sends the learner his best response to βt (ties
broken arbitrarily):
xˆt(βt) ∈ argmax
x
ut(x, β) (1)
• If the agent is non-strategic (yt = 1), then the agent does not modify the feature vector, and so
sends xˆt(βt) = xt to the learner.
4. The learner observes yt, and experiences classification loss ct(βt) = c(xˆt, yt, βt).
We are mainly interested in two standard classification loss functions c. The first is logistic loss, which
corresponds to logistic regression:
clog(xˆt, yt, βt) = log(1 + e
−yt·〈xˆt,βt〉)
The second is hinge loss, which corresponds to a support vector machine:
ch(xˆt, yt, βt) = max(0, 1− yt · 〈xˆt, βt〉)
The interaction between the learner and the agent in each strategic round can be viewed as a Stackelberg
game, in which the learner as the leader plays her strategy first, and then the agent as the follower best
responds. With this observation, we define a regret notion termed as Stackelberg regret for measuring
the performance of the learner.2 In words, Stackelberg regret is the difference between the cumulative
loss of the learner and the cumulative loss it would have experienced if it had deployed the single best
classifier in hindsight β∗, for the same sequence of agents (who would have responded differently). More
formally, for a history of play involving the n agents A = (a1, a2, . . . , an) and the sequence of n classifiers
B = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) the Stackelberg regret is defined to be
RS(A,B) =
n∑
t=1
c(xˆt(βt), yt, βt)− min
β∈K
n∑
t=1
c(xˆt(β), yt, β)
Observe that the regret-minimizing classifier β∗ is a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the learner
in the one-shot game in which the learner first commits to a classifier β∗, then all the agents (a1, . . . , an)
simultaneously respond with xˆt(β
∗), which results in the learner experiencing classification loss equal to
n∑
i=1
c(xˆi(β
∗), yi, β
∗).
In order to derive efficient algorithms with sub-linear Stackelberg regret, we will impose some restrictions
the agents’ distance functions dt (formally described in Section 3), and we will assume the feature vectors
xt have norm bounded by R1. We also assume our feasible set K ⊆ Rd is convex, contains the unit ℓ2-ball,
and has norm bounded by R2, such that for any β ∈ K, ‖β‖2 ≤ R2.
2The same regret notion has also appeared in the context of repeated security games (Balcan et al., 2015).
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3 Conditions for a Convex Learning Problem
In this section, we derive general conditions under which the learner’s problem in our setting can be cast
as a convex minimization problem. At each round, the learner proposes some hypothesis β and receives a
loss that depends on the best response of the strategic agent to β. Even when the original loss function is a
convex function of β alone, holding xˆ, y fixed, it may no longer be convex when xˆ is chosen strategically as
a function of β.
Since the learner’s objective is a summation of the loss over all rounds, and the sums of convex loss
functions are convex, it suffices to show convexity for the loss experienced at each fixed round t. In the
following, we omit the subscript t to avoid notational clutter.
Recall that each strategic agent a = (x, y, d) (with y = −1), when facing a classifier β, will misreport his
feature vector x as xˆ(β) by solving a maximization problem:
xˆ(β) ∈ argmax
xˆ∈Rd
u(xˆ, x, β) = argmax
xˆ∈Rd
〈xˆ, β〉 − d(xˆ, x)
where d(·, ·) is a “distance” function modeling the cost of deviating from the intended x.
We first show that both the logistic and hinge loss objective are convex if 〈xˆ(β), β〉 is convex in β, and
then prove the convexity of 〈xˆ(β), β〉 when the distance has the form d(x, y) = f(x − y), for f satisfying
reasonable assumptions (stated in Theorem 2). In Section 3.2, we give a large class of examples satisfying
our assumptions, as well as several examples of functions which fail to satisfy our assumptions for which
the problem we are studying is ill-posed (for example because strategic agents might not have finite best
responses). This shows that it is necessary to impose constraints on d when studying this problem.
As the first step, consider the learner’s objective function,
c(x, y, β) = h(y〈xˆ(β), β〉) = h(y〈xˆ(β, x, y), β〉).
where
xˆ(β, x, y) =
{
x, y = 1,
argmaxu(xˆ, x, β), y = −1.
Note that we are now writing xˆ(β, x, y) rather than xˆ(β) to make explicit the dependence on x and y. Where
x and y are clear from context and fixed, we continue to write xˆ(β). We note also that xˆ(β, x, y) is not
necessarily a well-defined mapping since the strategic agents can break the tie arbitrarily when the argmax
is not unique. However, as we show in Theorem 2, 〈xˆ(β), β〉 is well-defined, which is all that is necessary for
the learner’s cost to be well defined.
We instantiate h(z) as either logistic loss h(z) = log(1 + e−z) or hinge loss h(z) = (1 − z)+3: note that
both are non-increasing and convex functions in z.
We will rely on the following fact in convex analysis.
Lemma 1 (e.g. Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 5.1). Let g : R → R be a non-increasing convex function of a
single variable and F : Rd → R be convex. Then g(−F (x)) is convex in x.
This yields the following approach.
Theorem 1. Suppose, for all (x, y), a strategic agent’s best-response function xˆ(β, x, y) satisfies the condition
that the function β 7→ 〈xˆ(β), β〉 is convex. Then logistic loss and hinge loss are convex functions of β, i.e.
for all (x, y), both of the following are convex:
• (logistic) c(x, y, β) = log (1 + e−y〈xˆ(β),β〉);
• (hinge) c(x, y, β) = (1− y〈xˆ(β), β〉)+.
3We write (x)+ to denote max(x, 0).
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Proof. For strategic agents, i.e. when y = −1, this follows immediately from Lemma 1 and the fact that
both loss functions are non-increasing convex functions of the variable z = 〈xˆ(β), β〉. When y = 1, i.e. the
agent is not strategic, c(x, y, β) = h(〈β, x〉) = h(−〈β,−x〉). Note that 〈β,−x〉 is linear (and hence convex),
so the lemma applies here as well.
Therefore, in order to show the convexity of the learner’s loss function c(x, y, β) for every x, y, it suffices
to show that for any fixed x, 〈xˆ(β), β〉 = 〈xˆ(β, x, y), β〉 is convex in β. In the next section, we give sufficient
conditions for this to be the case.
3.1 Sufficient Conditions
We need to recall a definition before we present the main result of this section.
Definition 1. A function f : Rd → R is positive homogeneous of degree k if for any scalar α ∈ R with α > 0
and vector x ∈ Rd, we have
f(αx) = αkf(x).
Note that k need not be an integer.
Theorem 2. Let u(xˆ, x, β) = 〈xˆ, β〉 − d(xˆ, x) be the strategic agent’s utility function. If d has the form
d(xˆ, x) = f(xˆ− x) where f : Rd → R satisfies:
• f(x) > 0 for all x 6= 0;
• f is convex over Rd;
• f is positive homogeneous of degree r > 1
then the function β 7→ 〈β, argmax
xˆ
u(xˆ, x, β)〉 is well-defined (i.e. finite and independent of the choices of
maximizer) and convex.
Note that by this theorem, when the conditions hold we can speak of the function β 7→ 〈xˆ(β), β〉 without
ambiguity even when there are multiple best responses xˆ(β).
Proof. The proof is broken up into a series of steps, which are described here. The remainder of this
subsection then states each step in more detail and proves it.
1. First, we show (Corollary 3.1) that any best response xˆ(β) satisfies xˆ(β) = x + v, where v is some
subgradient of f∗ at β and f∗ is the convex conjugate of f .
2. Next, we show (Claim 2) that f∗(β) is finite for all β.
3. Next, we prove (Claim 3) that homogeneity of f∗ follows from homogeneity of f .
4. Finally, we apply a slight generalization of Euler’s Theorem, which says that if f∗ is homogenous and
convex, there is a k such that for any choice of subgradient v ∈ ∂f∗(β) (the set of subgradients at β),
we have 〈v, β〉 = kf∗(β). This, together with steps 2 and 3, implies that 〈xˆ(β), β〉 = 〈x, β〉 + kf∗(β)
for any choice of best response xˆ(β), and this function is well-defined and convex.
All missing proofs appear in the appendix.
We begin with the first step. First, we rewrite the utility function:
u(xˆ, x, β) = 〈xˆ, β〉 − f(xˆ− x).
We perform a change of variable from xˆ to w = xˆ− x and write:
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v(w, β) = u(xˆ, x, β) = 〈x, β〉 + 〈w, β〉 − f(w).
The first step only relies on the convexity of f . Let
w∗(β) = argmax
w∈Rd
v(w, β)
be the set of maximizers of v given β. We note that w∗(β) is a convex set since v(w, β) is concave in w for
any β. Note that if f is differentiable, w∗(β) is a singleton set.
Definition 2. The convex conjugate of a function f : Rd → R , denoted f∗ : Rd → R is the function defined
as
f∗(x∗) = sup
x∈Rd
(〈x∗, x〉 − f(x)).
f∗ is always convex (even when f is not) but is not necessarily finite. However, our positivity and homogeneity
assumptions imply that it must be finite everywhere, as we will prove in step 2.
Claim 1. The set w∗(β) is equal to ∂f∗(β), the set of subgradients of f∗ at β.
Proof. Fix a β. Recall that
v(w, β) = 〈x, β〉 + 〈w, β〉 − f(w).
〈x, β〉 is a constant since β is fixed and hence can be ignored. We have that
w ∈ w∗(β)⇔ 0 ∈ ∂[〈w, β〉 − f(w)]
⇔ β ∈ ∂f(w)
⇔ w ∈ ∂f∗(β).
The first equivalence follows from the optimality of w. The second follows from computation. To show the
last equivalence, we apply the following theorem from convex analysis:
Theorem 3 (Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 23.5; cf Corollary 10.1.1, Theorem 7.1). Let f : Rd → R be convex
and finite everywhere. Then
x∗ ∈ ∂f(x)⇔ x ∈ ∂f∗(x∗).
Therefore, we have the following
Corollary 3.1. The Strategic agent’s best-response set is
argmax
xˆ∈Rd
u(xˆ, x, β) = x+ w∗(β) = x+ ∂f∗(β).
We now move on to step 2. We want to show that f∗ is always finite and that the set of best responses
of the strategic agent is non-empty and bounded.
Claim 2. Under the assumptions in Theorem 2, f∗(β) is finite for all β ∈ Rd.
See Appendix B for the proof.
We now turn our attention to the set of best responses. The following theorem guarantees that the
strategic agents’ best response correspondence is well behaved:
Theorem 4 (Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 23.4). Suppose g : Rd → R is convex and finite everywhere. Then
∂g(x) is a non-empty compact subset of Rd for all x ∈ Rd.
Since we showed that f∗ is convex and finite everywhere, the above theorem, together with Corollary
3.1, implies:
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Corollary 4.1. Under the assumption of Theorem 2, the set argmax
xˆ∈Rd
u(xˆ, x, β) is non-empty and bounded
for all β ∈ Rd.
The boundedness of the set argmax
xˆ∈Rd
u(xˆ, x, β) is not directly used in the proof of Theorem 2, but it
excludes the unrealistic situation in which the strategic agent’s best response can be arbitrarily far from the
origin.
Step 3 consists of the following claim:
Claim 3. If f : Rd → R is convex and homogeneous of degree r > 1, then f∗ : Rd → R is convex and
homogeneous of degree s > 1, where 1r +
1
s = 1.
Throughout the rest of the paper, (r, s) (and also (p, q) which we will use when discussing norms) will
refer to such a pair of numbers unless stated otherwise. For the proof of Claim 3, see Appendix B.
Now we move on to step 4. First we show a slightly more general version of Euler’s theorem on homoge-
neous functions.
Theorem 5 (Euler). Assume g is convex and homogeneous of degree k > 0, then for any v ∈ ∂g(x),
〈v, x〉 = kg(x).
Note that: 1. This theorem is slightly more general than the standard statement of Euler’s theorem in
that it can deal with non-differentiable functions; 2. The value of the inner product is independent of the
choice of the subgradient, which is interesting.
Proof. Fix any x and consider the function g¯ : [0,∞)→ R defined by g¯(α) = g(αx). Convexity of g implies
that g¯ is a convex function of α:
g¯(δα+ (1− δ)α′) = g(δ(αx) + (1− δ)(α′x))
≤ δg(αx) + (1− δ)g(α′x)
= δg¯(α) + (1 − δ)g¯(α′).
We consider the set of subgradients of g¯(α) (which is well-defined as g¯ is convex). By a chain rule for the
subgradient (see Theorem 23.9 of Rockafellar (1970)), they are
∂g¯(α) = {〈x, v〉 | v ∈ ∂g(αx)} . (2)
On the other hand, by homogeneity, we have g¯(α) = αkg(x), and this is differentiable with respect to α with
dg¯
dα (α) = kα
k−1g(x), and in particular dg¯dα (1) = kg(x). So we must have that the set of subgradients of g¯ at
α = 1 equals this singleton set, i.e. ∂g¯(1) = {kg(x)}. Combining with (2), we get that for all v ∈ ∂g(x),
〈x, v〉 = kg(x).
Combining Claim 3 and Euler’s theorem, if f is convex and homogeneous of degree r > 1, we have that
〈xˆ(β), β〉 = 〈x, β〉 + sf∗(β)
for any xˆ(β) ∈ argmax
xˆ∈Rd
u(xˆ, x, β). This shows that 〈xˆ(β), β〉 is a well-defined convex function of β.
3.2 Examples
In this section we provide a large class of f that satisfy the assumptions in Theorem 2. We will also see that
for this class of functions f , we can derive simple closed form expressions for f∗, which will help us determine
the convergence rate for the optimization procedure we develop in Section 4. We will also see some examples
that violate our assumptions, which demonstrate the necessity of those assumptions: without them, agent
best responses are not necessarily well defined.
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Claim 4. For any abstract norm ‖ · ‖ on Rd and any r > 1
f(x) =
1
r
‖x‖r
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. Namely,
• f(x) > 0 for all x 6= 0;
• f is convex over Rd;
• f is positive homogeneous of degree r > 1.
Furthermore, let ‖ · ‖∗ be the dual norm of ‖ · ‖. f∗ has the following form:
f∗(β) =
1
s
‖β‖s∗.
Here 1/r + 1/s = 1.
The conditions can be easily checked. See Appendix B for the derivation of f∗.
Corollary 5.1. For any norm ‖ · ‖ on Rd, any r > 1 and any invertible linear transform A : Rd → Rd,
f(x) =
1
r
‖Ax‖r
satisfies all the conditions in Theorem 2. f∗ has the following form:
f∗(β) =
1
s
‖(AT )−1β‖s∗.
Proof. Since ‖A(·)‖ is also a norm, the conditions follow from Claim 4. The expression for f∗ is a result
from the following identity:
〈x, β〉 − g(Ax) = 〈Ax, (AT )−1β〉 − g(Ax).
In particular, if ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean 2-norm and r = s = 2, f(x) = 12‖Ax‖2 can be viewed as a form of
Mahalanobis distance, commonly studied in the metric learning literature (Kulis et al., 2013).
Combining Corollary 5.1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 1, we get the following result. This general approach
can naturally extend to other choices of distance functions as well via the same outline.
Corollary 5.2. For any norm ‖ ·‖ on Rd, any invertible linear transformation A : Rd → Rd, and any r > 1,
if an agent’s utility is of the form
u(xˆ, x, β) = 〈xˆ, β〉 − 1
r
‖Ax−Axˆ‖r,
then both the logistic loss and and hinge loss are convex functions of β, assuming the agent best-responds to
β.
Norms and nonexamples. We give two non-examples, which illustrate the following points:
1. There exist f which violate the condition that f is nonvanishing except at the origin, for which strategic
agents might not have finite best responses, and;
2. When we take the degree r = 1 (violating the r > 1 condition), again, strategic agents might not have
finite best responses.
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The first example shows that the linear transform A we used in Corollary 5.2 must be full rank. The second
example shows that f(x) = ‖x‖ where ‖ · ‖ is a norm (not raised to any power r > 1) also fails to constrain
the agent’s best responses to be finite
To illustrate the first point, consider a utility function of the form used in Corollary 5.2 but with matrix
A having non-trivial kernel. Assume v ∈ kerA, v 6= 0. Note that f(v) = 0 so it violates our non-degeneracy
condition. When xˆ = x+ λv, ∀λ ∈ R, the deviation incurs no cost since v is in the kernel of A. Whenever β
is not orthogonal to v, therefore, the agents have no finite best response: they can increase their utility to
+∞ by letting λ go to +∞ or −∞. Hence, for this choice of f , best responses for the agents are not even
well defined.
It is also natural to ask what happens when f is a norm (rather than a norm raised to some power r
greater than one). After all, any norm is positive homogeneous of degree 1. In this case too, agent best
responses are not necessarily well defined. The issue is that norms do not exhibit diminishing returns to
the agent as he moves xˆ increasingly far from x. Thus, the agent’s best response would always be either to
not manipulate at all (resulting in truthfully setting xˆ = x), or else to manipulate as much as possible, with
arbitrarily high reward achievable.
Claim 5. Suppose the agent’s distance function is d(xˆ, x) = ‖xˆ − x‖ for some norm ‖ · ‖, and let ‖ · ‖∗ be
the dual norm. Then his best response is xˆ = x for ‖β‖∗ ≤ 1; and if ‖β‖∗ > 1, his best response is undefined
with arbitrarily high utility achievable.
Proof. Let f be some norm, i.e. f(z) = ‖z‖. The agent wishes to solve
sup
xˆ
(〈xˆ, β〉 − f(xˆ− x)) =
= 〈x, β〉 + sup
xˆ
(〈xˆ − x, β〉 − f(xˆ− x))
= 〈x, β〉 + sup
x′
〈x′, β〉 − f(x′)
= 〈x, β〉 + f∗(β)
where f∗, the conjugate of f , is the (0−∞) indicator function of the unit ball in the dual norm (Rockafellar,
1970), namely
f∗(β) =
{
0 ||β||∗ 6 1
∞ otherwise.
This implies the theorem.
4 Regret Minimization
In this section, we will present an online convex optimization method that has sub-linear Stackelberg regret.
Our algorithm is a slight variant of the bandit algorithm in Flaxman et al. (2005), which only uses zeroth-
order feedback. That is, it only observes information of the form (input, function value). In our setting,
the learner always has access to zeroth-order information, as she observes the loss function at a particular
choice of parameters βt. However, when a non-strategic agent arrives, the learner can also deduce first-order
information, that is, the subgradient of the loss evaluated at βt. Our algorithm takes advantage of this
mixture of feedback and performs a full subgradient descent update for every non-strategic round. As a
result, we obtain a regret rate that depends on the fraction of strategic agents that show up.
4.1 Convex Optimization with Mixture Feedback
In this section, we abstract away from the particular forms of the loss function until they become relevant.
At a high level, our algorithm is running (stochastic) subgradient descent to minimize a sequence of convex
loss functions ct(β) while the learner proposes a sequence of parameters βt. The key challenge is to obtain
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subgradient feedback based on the agent’s data (xˆ, y). In each non-strategic round, we can explicitly compute
a subgradient in ∂ct(βt). In other words, we have first-order information. In each strategic round, however,
since xˆt is a function of βt, we do not have direct access to the subgradients of ct, and only see the “zeroth-
order” information ct(βt).
To estimate a subgradient with this information, we utilize the approach of Flaxman et al. (2005) and
minimize a “smoothed” version of the classification loss. In particular, for any ct and parameter δ, the
δ-smoothed version of ct is defined as:
c˜t(β) = E[ct(β + δS)]
where S is a random vector drawn from the uniform distribution over the unit sphere in Rd. Notice that c˜t
is both convex and differentiable. Flaxman et al. (2005) provides a method to obtain an unbiased estimate
for the gradient of the smoothed loss c˜. This is done by perturbing βt to get a noisy β
+
t and then evaluating
the classification loss at β+t . More formally:
Lemma 2 (Flaxman et al. (2005)). Let β+t = βt + δ · S and Gt = dδ ct(β+t )S, where S is a random vector
drawn from the uniform distribution over the unit sphere in Rd. Then E[Gt] = ∇c˜t(βt).
Note that the perturbed point β+t may fall outside of the feasible set K. To prevent that, we will optimize
over a strict subset Kδ = {(1−δ)β | β ∈ K}. Then we can guarantee that for any β ∈ Kδ, the δ-ball centered
at β is fully contained in K.4
Let θ = #{t:yt=−1}n be the fraction of rounds in which the learner interacts with a strategic agent. For
simplicity, we assume for now that θ is known to the algorithm in advance, and use it to set the parameters
η and δ in our algorithm. However, as we discuss at the end of this section, any upper bound θˆ on θ suffices,
and can be used in its place, at the cost of only an additional additive constant to the final regret bound.
We are now ready to present our main algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Convex optimization with mixture feedback
Input: smoothing parameter δ = θ1/4 ·
√
dMR
L(R+3) · n−1/4, subset to optimize over Kδ ⊂ K, step size
η = R/
√
n(θ · d2M2δ2 + (1− θ)L2)
For each round t:
Let St be drawn uniformly from the unit sphere;
Let β+t = βt + δ · St;
Query at β+t , observe corresponding xˆt, yt, and suffer loss ct(β
+
t );
Compute stochastic subgradient:
If yt = 1, then set gt as a subgradient in ∂ct(βt); otherwise set gt =
d
δ · ct(β+t ) · St .
Update: βt+1 = ΠKδ (βt − ηgt), where ΠKδ is the Euclidean projection map onto the set Kδ.
Now we will proceed to bound the regret rate of our algorithm. To facilitate our analysis, we will make
the following well-behaved assumption on the loss function ct for all rounds t:
• |ct(β)| 6 M for any β ∈ K, and
• ct is L-Lipschitz (with respect to the ℓ2 norm) over the set K.
In Appendix A, we will work out the parameters M and L for both logistic loss and hinge loss, along
with distance function of the form dt(x, y) = f(At(x − y)) for the strategic agents.
The following lemma allows us to bound the regret separately in non-strategic and strategic rounds, and
also bounds the additional regret due to the δ-smoothing of our losses.
4 Any β+
t
= (1− δ)β + δv for some β ∈ K and some unit vector v. We assume K contains the unit ball, in particular, both
v and β are in the convex set K, and β+
t
is a convex combination of them so it also lies in K.
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Lemma 3. Let T1 := {t : yt = 1, t = 1, 2, . . . , n} be the non-strategic rounds and T−1 := {t : yt = −1, t =
1, 2, . . . , n} be the strategic rounds. Then for any β ∈ K,
E
[
n∑
t=1
ct(β
+
t )− ct(β)
]
6 E

 ∑
t∈T−1
c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β)

 + E
[∑
t∈T1
ct(βt)− ct(β)
]
+ 3nLδ,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the algorithm.
Proof. Fix any β ∈ Kδ. Since the vector S is drawn from the unit sphere, |ct(β+δS)−ct(β)| 6 L‖δS‖ = Lδ.
Hence by taking expectation over S,
|c˜t(β)− ct(β)| 6 Lδ. (3)
Recall that β+t = βt+ δ ·S, by Lipschitz property again, |ct(β+t )− ct(βt)| 6 Lδ. For any t ∈ T−1, we have
|ct(β+t )− c˜t(βt)| 6 |ct(β+t )− ct(βt)|+ |ct(βt)− c˜t(βt)|
6 Lδ + Lδ = 2Lδ.
(4)
Now, we want to bound the difference between the two expressions, ct(β
+
t ) − ct(β) and c˜t(βt) − c˜t(β). By
Equation (4), we have |ct(β+t )− c˜t(βt)| ≤ 2Lδ, and by Equation (3), we have |ct(β)− c˜t(β)| ≤ Lδ. It follows
that
ct(β
+
t )− ct(β) 6 c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β) + 3Lδ.
Similarly, for any t ∈ T1, we can bound
ct(β
+
t )− ct(β) 6 ct(βt)− ct(β) + Lδ.
Summing over all rounds t, we recover the stated bound.
By bounding the regret separately in non-strategic and strategic rounds, we can then bound the Stack-
elberg regret of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 6. For any sequence of agents A = (a1, . . . , an), Algorithm 1 will output a sequence of classifiers
B = (β1, . . . , βn) such that the expected Stackelberg regret satisfies
E [RS(A,B)] 6 η
2
[nθ · d
2M2
δ2
+ n(1− θ)L2] + 1
2η
R2 + 3nLδ + nLRδ.
Proof. Our proof essentially follows from the standard analysis for online subgradient descent. We will first
bound
E

 ∑
t∈T−1
c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β∗)

+ E
[∑
t∈T1
ct(βt)− ct(β∗)
]
which then allows us to apply Lemma 3. By convexity, we get for any β ∈ K,
c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β) 6 〈∇c˜t(βt), βt − β〉
and for any subgradient Gt(β) ∈ ∂ct(βt),
ct(βt)− ct(β) 6 〈Gt(β), βt − β〉.
c˜t(β
+
t )− c˜t(β) = [c˜t(β+t )− c˜t(βt)] + [c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β)]
6 L0δ + c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β)
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Recall that for any t ∈ T1, gt ∈ ∂ct(βt), and by Lemma 2, we know for t ∈ T−1, we can write gt = ∇c˜t(βt)−ξt
where ξt is a random vector with zero mean. Let β
′ ∈ argminβ∈Kδ
∑n
t=1 ct(β), then
∑
t∈T−1
[c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β′)] +
∑
t∈T1
[ct(βt)− ct(β′)] 6
n∑
t=1
〈gt, βt − β′〉+
∑
t∈T−1
〈ξt, βt − β′〉.
Taking the expectation, we have
E[
∑
t∈T−1
c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β′)] + E[
∑
t∈T1
ct(βt)− ct(β′)] 6 E
n∑
t=1
〈gt, βt − β′〉. (5)
Now we can employ the standard cosine law trick (see e.g. Bubeck (2015), Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (2001))
and get:
〈gt, βt − β′〉 6 η
2
‖gt‖2 + 1
2η
(‖β′ − βt‖2 − ‖β′ − βt+1‖2)
Summing them up, telescoping and leaving out the negative term yields:
n∑
t=1
〈gt, βt − β′〉 6 η
2
n∑
t=1
‖gt‖2 + 1
2η
‖β′ − β1‖2 (6)
Since we have
‖gt‖ 6
{
L, yt = 0,
d
δ ·M, yt = 1,
Combining (5) and (6) and using the above bound for gt, we get
E[
∑
t∈T−1
c˜t(βt)− c˜t(β′)] + E[
∑
t∈T1
ct(βt)− ct(β′)] 6 η
2
[nθ · d
2M2
δ2
+ n(1− θ)L2] + 1
2η
R2. (7)
Finally, we need bound the additional error we incur for restricting to the subset Kδ. Since for any point
β ∈ K, the closet point to β in Kδ has ℓ2 distance no more than δR, by the Lipschitz property of each ct,
we know
n∑
t=1
ct(β
′)− min
β∈K
n∑
t=1
ct(β) ≤ nLRδ (8)
Our regret bound then follows from Equation (7) and Equation (8).
In Corollary 6.1, we provide a regret rate for three different regimes of p (hiding dependence on M , L,
and R).
Corollary 6.1. For different ranges of θ, we can bound the expected Stackelberg regret by
E [RS(A,B)] 6


O(
√
n), θ = 0,
O(
√
dn3/4), θ = Ω(1),
O(
√
dn1−
1+γ
4 ) θ = O(n−γ)
Proof. Plugging the algorithm parameter η = R/
√
n(θ · d2M2δ2 + (1− θ)L2) into the regret bound in Theo-
rem 6,
RS 6
√
θ · d
2M2
δ2
+ (1 − θ)L2 · √n · R+ nδL(R+ 3).
Using
√
a+ b 6
√
a+
√
b, we can further simplify the bound:
RS 6
√
nθ · dMR
δ
+ LR
√
n(1− θ) + nδL(R+ 3).
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Plugging in δ = θ1/4 ·
√
dMR
L(R+3) · n−1/4 yields:
RS 6 LR
√
n(1− θ) + n3/4
√
dMLR(R+ 3)θ1/4.
The rest of the result follows by setting θ = 0,Ω(1) or O(n−γ).
Relaxing θ to θˆ Let θˆ be an upper bound on the true fraction of strategic agents in rounds 1, 2, . . . , n,
i.e. θ 6 θˆ. We briefly explain why θˆ can be used in place of θ in setting the parameters of Algorithm 1, and
Corollary 6.1 still holds (with θˆ replacing θ in the bound.) First, consider the case in which dMδ > L. In this
case, the right hand side of the bound in Theorem 6 is increasing in θ, so we can replace θ with θˆ and still
get a correct regret bound:
E [RS(A,B)] 6 η
2
[nθˆ · d
2M2
δ2
+ n(1− θˆ)L2] + 1
2η
R2 + 3nLδ + nLRδ.
Thus, we can carry out the calculations from the proof of Corollary 6.1, again with θˆ replacing θ. Finally, it
is not hard to show that when n > ( LdM )
2, we are in the case in which dMδ > L. Since we assume ct(β) 6 M ,
each round incurs regret at most 2M . Therefore in the remaining case in which n < ( LdM )
2, we can upper
bound the regret by 2M · n 6 2M · ( LdM )2. Hence, we obtain the regret bound
RS 6 max
{
LR
√
n(1− θˆ) + n3/4
√
dMLR(R+ 3)θˆ1/4,
2L2
d2M
}
.
The new (second) term in the maximum is independent of n, and so does not change the asymptotic bound
stated in Corollary 6.1.
Applying other tools for bandit convex optimization We can in fact apply other tools for bandit
convex optimization to minimize regret. For example, we can use the algorithm in Bubeck et al. (2017), which
will achieve a Stackelberg regret rate of O˜(d9.5
√
n) even when all the agents are strategic (that is p = 1).
Our algorithm, which is a variant of Flaxman et al. (2005), has a regret rate with a worse dependence on
the time horizon, but has a milder dependence on the dimension. Furthermore, it also permits a natural
interpolation between the fully strategic and fully non-strategic settings (as shown in Corollary 6.1).
Deriving the Constants In Appendix A, we first illustrate how to determine the constants L and M
that appear in our regret bound for general classes of cost functions d(x, y), namely any abstract norm raised
to some power greater than 1:
d(x, y) =
1
r
‖x− y‖r.
The constant C in the inequality ‖x‖2 6 C‖x‖ can be used to determine L and M . See Theorem 7 for
details.
We also give explicit expressions for L and M when the abstract norm is some p-norm with p > 1. See
Corollary 7.1.
All assumptions and the resulting fully expanded regret bound are described in Theorem 8. We state
here a noteworthy special case that has an especially mild dependence on the dimension d:
When 1 6 p 6 2, and for any power r > 1, Algorithm 1 has regret bound:
E [RS(A,B)] 6


O(
√
n), θ = 0,
O(
√
dn3/4), θ = Ω(1),
O(
√
dn1−
1+γ
4 ), θ = O(n−γ).
i.e. for p norms when 1 6 p 6 2, regardless of the power r > 1, we obtain a fixed (and mild) dependence on
d. When p > 2, the situation changes: our dependence on d grows with p, and shrinks with r.
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5 Discussion and Open Questions
Our work suggests a number of interesting directions. Broadly speaking, these can be grouped into two
thrusts: broadening the class of problems to which our approach can be applied, and weakening the assump-
tions that need to be made about the agents. Here we list a concrete example of each type of question.
The broad approach we take in this paper is to identify classes of utility functions for the strategic
agents, that when paired with natural cost functions for the learner, lead to a convex objective, even in
the strategic setting. However, this precludes several natural utility functions for the agents: most notably,
utility functions that are defined in terms of 0/1 classification loss. What can be done in the face of non-
convexity? When agent cost functions d are known and separable, Hardt et al. (2016) show that even for 0/1
loss, Stackelberg equilibria have structure that allows for their efficient computation, despite non-convexity
of the learner’s objective. Can similar structure be taken advantage of in the setting we consider, when agent
cost functions are not known to the learner?
Next, the overarching motivation of this paper is to weaken the assumptions on the knowledge of the
learner necessary to solve the strategic classification problem. We should also aim to weaken other assump-
tions. For example, we assume in this paper that strategic agents play exact best responses — i.e. the
always exactly optimize their utility function. What if strategic agents are not perfect – i.e. they are only
guaranteed to play approximate best responses (or, perhaps only usually guaranteed to). Is it possible to
give optimization procedures with guarantees that are robust to strategic agent imperfection?
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A Concrete Regret Bounds for Specific Examples
We bounded the Stackelberg regret of our algorithm in terms of problem-dependent constants L and M . In
this section, we go through several examples, in which we work out explicit bounds on L and M , first for
abstract norms, then for the class of Lp norms.
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Note: In this section, the norm notation without any subscript, ‖·‖, denotes an abstract norm in Rd. ‖·‖∗
denotes its dual norm. ‖ · ‖p denotes the Euclidean p-norm, i.e. ‖x‖pp =
∑d
i=1 |xi|p when 1 6 p < +∞ and
‖x‖∞ = maxi |xi|.
Recall from the previous section that when the distance function d(x, y) in the strategic agent’s utility
function has the form
d(x, y) =
1
r
‖x− y‖r
we showed that
〈β, xˆ(β)〉 = 〈β, x〉+ ‖β‖s∗.
Again 1/r + 1/s = 1, r, s > 1.
We make the following assumptions:
• ‖x‖2 6 R1. That is, the “real” feature vectors lie in a ball of radius R1;
• ‖β‖2 6 R2. That is, our target parameters lie in a ball of radius R2.
With the above assumptions, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 7. For logistic loss, h(z) = log(1 + e−z), and hinge loss, h(z) = (1− z)+, and for any norm ‖ · ‖
such that ‖x‖2 6 C‖x‖, the loss function c(x, y, β) = h(y〈β, xˆ(β)〉) has the following properties:
1. |c(x, y, β)| 6 1 +R1R2 + CsRs2.
2. c(x, y, β) is L-Lipschitz in β, where L can be taken to be
R1 + sC
sRs−12 .
Remark 1. For any norm, there is some such constant C as required in the theorem, since any two norms
on Rd are equivalent. Note that C may depend on the dimension d.
Proof. Since the 2-norm is self-dual, the following lemma holds
Lemma 4. The norm pair (‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗) and constant C > 0 satisfy
‖x‖2 6 C‖x‖, ∀x ∈ Rd
if and only if they satisfy
‖β‖∗ 6 C‖β‖2
.
Proof. We only show the “only if” direction. The other follows exactly the same reasoning.
Assume that ‖x‖2 6 C‖x‖, ∀x ∈ Rd. Then {x : ‖x‖ = 1} is a subset of {x : ‖x‖2 6 C}. Hence for any
β ∈ Rd,
‖β‖∗ = sup
x:‖x‖=1
〈β, x〉 6 sup
x:‖x‖26C
〈β, x〉 = C · sup
x:‖x‖261
〈β, x〉 = C‖β‖2.
This proves the “only if” direction.
Both h(t) = log(1 + e−t) and h(t) = (1− t)+ satisfy
0 6 h(t) 6 |t|+ 1, |h′(t)| 6 1
for any t ∈ R.
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As a consequence,
|c(x, y,β)| = |h(y〈β, xˆ(β)〉)| 6
6 1 + |y〈β, xˆ(β)〉)| = 1 + |〈β, xˆ(β)〉)|.
So in order to bound |c(x, y, β)|, it suffices to bound |〈β, xˆ(β)〉| as follows:
|〈β, xˆ(β)〉| 6 |〈β, x〉|+ ‖β‖s∗
6 ‖β‖2 · ‖x‖2 + (C‖β‖2)s
6 R1R2 + C
sRs2.
This yields the bound on |c(x, y, β)| as stated in the theorem. Since |h′(t)| 6 1, the Lipschitz constant L
of |c(x, y, β)| can be taken to be the Lipschitz constant for the function 〈β, xˆ(β)〉. Recall that 〈β, xˆ(β)〉 =
〈β, x〉 + ‖β‖s∗. So
• The Lipschitz constant of the function β 7→ 〈β, x〉, with respect to the 2-norm, is ‖x‖2;
• The Lipschitz constant for the function ‖β‖∗ 7→ ‖β‖s∗ is s(sup ‖β‖∗)s−1;
• The Lipschitz constant for the function β 7→ ‖β‖∗, with respect to the 2-norm, is C, as we have shown
in the beginning of the proof that ‖β‖∗ 6 C‖β‖2.
Therefore, L is bounded by
‖x‖2 + s(sup ‖β‖∗)s−1 · C 6 R1 + sCsRs−12 .
Corollary 7.1. When ‖x‖ has the form ‖x‖ = ‖Ax‖p and hence d(x, y) = 1r‖A(x− y)‖rp with the additional
assumption that σd(A) > ε where σd(A) denotes the smallest singular value of A, c(x, y, β) has the following
properties:
1. |c(x, y, β)| 6 1 +R1R2 + ε−sd(s/q−s/2)+ ·Rs2;
2. c(x, y, β) is L-Lipschitz in β, where L can be taken to be
R1 + s · ε−sd(s/q−s/2)+ · Rs−12 .
Here 1/p+ 1/q = 1, 1 6 p, q 6 +∞.
Remark 2. The condition on the smallest singular value of A amounts to saying that A is ε-far from being
singular. Mathematically, the operator norm ‖(AT )−1‖2 = ‖A−1‖2 = σd(A)−1 6 ε−1. Recall that when A
is singular a strategic agent can move x in some beneficial direction for free, resulting in her best response
typically being undefined.
Proof. We need the following lemma relating a general r-norm and 2-norm.
Lemma 5. Let x ∈ Rd. When q > 2,
‖x‖q 6 ‖x‖2.
When 0 < q 6 2,
‖x‖q 6 d1/q−1/2‖x‖2.
Both of these bounds are tight. A simplified statement is:
For any q > 0,
‖x‖q 6 d(1/q−1/2)+ · ‖x‖2.
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By Theorem 7, it suffices to determine the constant C. When ‖x‖ has the form ‖x‖ = ‖Ax‖p, its dual
norm is ‖β‖∗ = ‖(AT )−1β‖q. By Lemma 4, it suffices to determine C from expression
‖(AT )−1β‖q 6 C‖β‖2.
Apply Lemma 5 and we have
‖(AT )−1β‖q 6 d(1/q−1/2)+‖(AT )−1β‖2
6 d(1/q−1/2)+‖(AT )−1‖2 · ‖β‖2
6 d(1/q−1/2)+ε−1 · ‖β‖2.
Hence C can be taken to be ε−1d(1/q−1/2)+ . Plugging this into Theorem 7 yields the claimed result.
In the end, we present all the assumptions we have made and the resulting fully expanded regret bound.
Theorem 8. Assume the following for t = 1, 2, . . . , n:
• The strategic agents have utility of the following form:
ut(x, β) = 〈β, x〉 − dt(xt, x) = 〈β, x〉 − 1
r
‖At(xt − x)‖rp
with 1 6 p 6 +∞ and 1 < r < +∞;
• ‖xt‖2 6 R1;
• The smallest singular value of At, σd(At) satisfies σd(At) > ε.
Then Algorithm 1 incurs regret
E [RS(A,B)] 6


O(
√
n), θ = 0,
O(n3/4d(s/q−s/2)++1/2), θ = Ω(1),
O(n
3−γ
4 d(s/q−s/2)++1/2), θ = O(n−γ).
In particular, when 1 6 p 6 2, regardless of the power r, we have the regret bound simplified as:
E [RS(A,B)] 6


O(
√
n), θ = 0,
O(
√
dn3/4), θ = Ω(1),
O(
√
dn1−
1+γ
4 ), θ = O(n−γ).
Remark 3. In terms of the dependence of E [RS(A,B)] on the dimension d, we can see from the above
theorem:
• When 1 6 p 6 2, regardless of the power r, we achieve small dependence on d;
• When p > 2, the larger p is and the smaller power r, the more severe our dependence on d becomes.
B Missing Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Claim 2
Claim. Under the assumptions in Theorem 2, f∗(β) is finite for all β ∈ Rd.
Proof. We need the following lemma:
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Lemma 6 (Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 10.1, Corollary 10.1.1). A convex function finite on all of Rd is
necessarily continuous.
This lemma shows continuity of f under our assumptions.
In particular, letting α ↓ 0 in the homogeneity condition f(αx) = αpf(x) implies that f(0) = 0.
Let Sd−1 be the unit sphere in Rd. If we take the supremum to find the convex conjugate f∗ with respect
to polar coordinates, we have
f∗(β) := sup
x∈Rd
〈β, x〉 − f(x) = sup
v∈Sd−1
(sup
ρ>0
(〈β, ρv〉 − f(ρv)))
= sup
v∈Sd−1
( sup
ρr>0
(ρ〈β, v〉 − ρpf(v)))
Since v ∈ Sd−1, it cannot be 0. By our first assumption on f , f(v) > 0. The inner supremum can be
computed explicitly:
sup
ρr>0
(ρ〈β, v〉 − ρpf(v)) = r
1−s
s
〈β, v〉sf(v)1−s.
By the continuity lemma, the above expression is a continuous function of v. Taking the supremum over a
compact set Sd−1 can only yield a finite value, hence
f∗(β) = sup
v∈Sd−1
r1−s
s
〈β, v〉sf(v)1−s < +∞.
Therefore, f∗ is finite everywhere.
Proof of Claim 3
Claim. If f : Rd → R is convex and homogeneous of degree r > 1, then f∗ : Rd → R is convex and
homogeneous of degree s > 1, where 1r +
1
s = 1.
Proof. We begin by making the following observations regarding convex conjugates:
g(x) = f(αx) ⇒ g∗(β) = f∗(α−1β)
g(x) = αf(x) ⇒ g∗(β) = αf∗(α−1β)
These two rules follow directly from taking suprema on both sides of these equalities:
〈β, x〉 − f(αx) = 〈α−1β, αx〉 − f(αx)
〈β, x〉 − αf(x) = α[〈α−1β, x〉 − f(x)]
So taking the convex conjugate on both sides of f(αx) = αrf(x) yields:
f∗(α−1β) = αrf∗(α−rβ) (9)
Let’s do two change of variables, v = α−1β and γ = α1−r. Note that γv = α−rβ. Plugging all these into
Equation (9) changes variables from α, β to γ, v, as illustrated below:
f∗(v) = αrf∗(γv)
f∗(γv) = α−rf∗(v)
= γ
r
r−1 f∗(v) = γsf∗(v)
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Proof of Claim 4
Claim. For any abstract norm ‖ · ‖ on Rd and any r > 1
f(x) =
1
r
‖x‖r
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. Namely,
• f(x) > 0 for all x 6= 0;
• f is convex over Rd;
• f is positive homogeneous of degree r > 1.
Furthermore, let ‖ · ‖∗ be the dual norm of ‖ · ‖. f∗ has the following form:
f∗(β) =
1
s
‖β‖s∗.
Here 1/r + 1/s = 1.
Proof. The conditions can be easily checked. We only prove the expression for f∗.
By definition, we have that 〈x, β〉 6 ||x|| · ||y||∗, so
〈x, β〉 − 1
r
||x||r 6 ||x|| · ||β||∗ − 1
r
||x||r
for any x ∈ Rd. We treat the right-hand side as a function of ‖x‖, which is upper-bounded by 1s ||β||s∗. We
can rewrite the inequality as
〈x, β〉 − 1
r
||x||r 6 1
s
||β||s∗
Since the left-hand side is an upper bound of f∗(β), f∗(β) 6 1s ||β||s∗.
Next, let x˜ ∈ Rd be such that 〈x˜, β〉 = ||x˜|| · ||β||∗, appropriately scaled such that ||x˜||r = ||β||s∗. Then,
for this particular x˜,
〈x˜, β〉 − 1
r
||x˜||r = 1
s
||β||s∗
Therefore, we have the inequality
f∗(β) >
1
s
||β||s∗
Since we now have inequalities in both directions, we must have that f∗(β) = 1s ||β||s∗, as desired.
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